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Religious truth in a globalising world: new 




The current situation for religion in Western societies is a very 
ambivalent one and therefore raises many new and unexpected 
questions, not in the least for philosophy of religion. The well-known 
secularisation thesis, according to which religions would become a 
more and more marginal phenomenon as scientific reason 
disenchanted the world, is no longer the dominant paradigm. On the 
contrary, against all odds there is not only a growing interest in all 
kinds of religious phenomena in many highly secularised societies, but 
many people moreover seem to be especially intrigued by those 
religious manifestations that have withstood the wave of secularisation 
and rationalisation during the second half of the 20th century. All 
kinds of spirituality, New Age and esotericism included, are hot issues; 
there are waiting lists for people who want to spend some time in a 
monastery to share the life of the monks; hundreds of thousands take 
part in the World Youth Days; faith healing sessions are widely 
attended; new religious movements, especially evangelical and 
spiritual ones, are booming; people build their own house altars with 
images of Jesus and Buddha, as well as with a Jewish menorah. 
However, this obvious increase of interest in religious matters in 
general does not involve a more positive attitude towards the 
traditional churches, which would be expressed by: an increase of the 
number of people attending divine services, a greater willingness to 
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accept the moral and doctrinal teachings of the Church, to observe its 
sacramental rules, and by a rise in the number of vocations. 
This ambivalent interest in religion is determined to a large extent by 
two attitudes characteristic of contemporary postmodern people, viz. 
‘bricolage’ and consumerism. Bricolage refers to the fact that the 
religious convictions and practices of many people are the result of 
tinkering, of constructing and reconstructing elements of various 
religious traditions into an individual religious patchwork, as the 
example given above illustrates. Whether or not this ‘bricolage’ is 
successful does not depend on an objective standard, for example the 
doctrine of the Church or religious community, but only on subjective 
preferences, on whether one feels good with them. Consumerism 
stands for the attitude of people, behaving with regard to religion in a 
similar way as consumers in a supermarket: in the offer of religious 
commodities they pick and choose what they expect to best meet their 
personal needs. Besides, the religious supermarket is only one market 
out of many in the enormous shopping mall of modern culture, all of 
them trying to seduce the consumer to buy lifestyle goods from them. 
It does not make sense to consult a consumers’ magazine in lifestyle 
affairs to find help in making the ‘right’ choice, the best value for 
money. Again, this shows that there is no objective standard to orient 
people in their lives. Therefore, postmodern individuals are constantly 
constructing the content and meaning of their lives, gaining 
information about whether there is anything attractive in the latest 
trends, desperately hoping to find recognition for their lifestyle from 
other people, and always afraid of being out of vogue. 
Although the ‘bricoleurs’ and the consumerists still dominate the 
religious scene, their way of handling religious ‘commodities’ has 
become confused by a relatively new factor, whose impact is growing 
fast, viz. globalisation. It is obvious that globalisation penetrates all 
sectors of society, and has a major impact on all kinds of religious and 
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non-religious worldviews, values and practices. First, there are the 
effects of the increase of migration on Western societies; mainly as a 
result of the influx of non-Western citizens. The number of non-
Christian communities of faith, as well as the number of their 
members, has increased considerably; the rise of Islam is the most 
striking example of this development. Due to this same migration 
process the internal diversity of Christian communities of faith has 
grown dramatically; we gradually become aware of what it means that 
Christianity is indeed a world religion, and that the Western, highly 
secularised, ‘bricolagist’ and consumerist type of Christianity is only 
one of its ramifications, and not even the largest one. Secondly, there 
is the fact that the media and the consequences of global politics 
confront us with norms and values that diverge much more than 
before from the Western way of life that we are familiar with. The 
media shows us almost daily images that make us aware of the fact 
that our way of looking at ourselves and the world is but a minority 
viewpoint. As far as global politics is concerned, Western societies 
experience these considerable differences in norms and values in 
practice when they try to export their democratic, tolerant, liberal etc. 
way of life to other continents through so called peace keeping and 
peace enforcement operations, often with little success. 
These effects of globalisation, which are not expected to come to an 
end soon, confront not only Christian faithful, but also secular people 
in the Western world with changing quantitative proportions between 
communities, new worldviews, values, moral standards, and practices 
that diverge substantially from, until recently, the generally accepted 
ones. They affect the self evidence of our ideas and behaviours, and 
consequently raise many new questions in the fields of social sciences, 
law, education, but also philosophy of religion. Until recently, the real 
differences in Western societies between the most common ways of 
life were still limited, because Catholicism, Protestantism, Humanism, 
Liberalism and Socialism, in spite of all their controversies, belonged 
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to the same Western culture. They had a long history in common, 
understood and respected each others ‘ideological’ language, and had 
each from its perspective contributed to the advancement of 
(post)modern society, including the values of religious freedom and 
tolerance. However, due to the process of globalisation, a dramatic 
qualitative and quantitative increase in the variety of ways of life has 
occurred, because their proponents to a large extent do not share the 
same history, do not speak the same language, do not naturally agree 
with some of the basic values of postmodern society. Especially 
because these differences not only keep us busy on a theoretical level, 
but also manifest themselves practically in our everyday life; the 
question then arises as to what all these different ways of life stand for 
and how they can relate to each other in a peaceful and respectful 
way? To give only a few examples: our idea of the role of women in 
public life meets with the opposition of people who see the care for the 
house and the family as the primary task of women. The recent 
change in the legislation of several Western countries in order to allow 
gay people to get married and to adopt children is considered by 
numerous people as undermining the very substance of marriage and 
the family. The way in which we treat elderly people, who gave birth 
to us and from whose past efforts we still abundantly benefit, is 
nothing less than appalling for many people from non-Western 
countries. We easily interpret the wearing of a scarf by Muslim girls 
and women as a sign of sexual and religious oppression; it might as 
well be considered as a protest against the excrescences of an over-
sexed Western society. In sum, some of our basic values, religious and 
secular ones, considered by us as important achievements of our 
society, are queried by other people, often of a non-Western origin, 
but who nevertheless live next door: they do not consider them as a 
sign of liberation and progress, but as one of moral decline. They 
moreover are convinced that they don’t have to be tolerant with 
regard to these opinions and practices, because in their view they are 
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simply wrong. Confronted with these phenomena, a critical question 
can be asked to Western society—isn’t its self-proclaimed 
multiculturalism, according to which the variety of ways of life 
(including more traditional ones) is not only tolerated but even 
welcomed, at odds with its implicit dominant credo that, in order to 
be accepted as a full member of this society, you have to be 
individualistic, emancipated, secular, sexually liberated. And further 
that if you (still) belong to a religious community, you have to confine 
your religious practices strictly to the private sphere?  
This brings me to the topic of this contribution. The foregoing has 
shown that one of the most obvious effects of a globalising world is a 
strong increase in the number of new ways of life and of their 
diversity. At the same time the interdependency of the lives of people 
has increased dramatically as well; on many (technical, economical, 
social, political, cultural) levels our ways of life affect each other much 
more than before. This is but another aspect of a globalising society. 
With regard to religion, the question is how people with quite 
diverging religious and non-religious ways of life can live together 
peacefully and with respect for each other’s substantial convictions 
and practices? However important it is that individual societies 
answer this question pragmatically, it also has to be dealt with on a 
more theoretical level, as pragmatic answers threaten to fail because 
these ways of life lack a common universe of discourse and practice, as 
we saw above. In my view, the way in which this issue should be dealt 
with differs considerably from the current postmodern approach, 
which is still quite popular. I think it essential to develop a new 
common ground, especially in the field of (religious) ways of life, 
however enormous this challenge is. The issue of common ground 
refers to an underlying theoretical question, that of (religious) truth, 
which traditionally belongs to philosophy of religion. Although this 
question seemed to have evaporated with the rise of the ‘anything 
goes’ of postmodernism, globalisation has put it back on the agenda 
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again. Of course, my answer to this enormous challenge can only be a 
modest and provisional one. The issue I am dealing with is not so 
much whether specific religious convictions or practices are true, but 
concerns a critical discussion of existing and possible new ways to 
approach the issue of religious truth. Given the globalisation of 
(religious) ways of life, which presuppositions have to be met so that 
people can discuss the truth of their ways of life with each other in a 
respectful way? I will first examine two popular, contrastive ways of 
dealing with religious truth: traditional theism and postmodern 
philosophy, and then present my own answer to this question. 
The problems of theism: a ‘foundationalist’ idea of 
religious truth  
In order to understand the nature and problems of theism, it is 
important to determine its specific origin and nature. It is not as old as 
Christian religion as such, but emerged at the beginning of modernity 
as an attempt to determine God’s true nature and essential attributes 
in a purely philosophical manner. In a time of growing scepticism 
about the capacity of human reason to know truth at all, and 
especially God’s nature, modern philosophy emerged. Having freed 
itself from its tutelage by (religious) tradition and theology, it was 
convinced of its capacity to lay a new, solid foundation for all true 
knowledge by universally implementing the method of mathematics, 
which had proven to be so successful in astronomy and physics. 
Descartes is one of the clearest promoters of this program. He 
considered his methodic doubt as the pre-eminent means to put an 
end to all contingent opinions and to lay once and for all a solid 
foundation for all true knowledge. This new philosophical method 
was also supposed to be able to prove the essential truths of Christian 
religion, viz. the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In 
the dedication of his philosophical opus magnum, the Meditations on 
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first philosophy, to the professors of the theological faculty of the 
Parisian university he affirms that he has “always been of the opinion 
that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of 
those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than 
of Theology” (Descartes 1996: 1). Descartes’ main argument for 
preferring philosophy to theology was that, while the latter was 
limited by faith, the former rests on reason alone. Therefore 
philosophy is much more suitable to persuade the infidels of the truth 
of Christian religion, since it can prove the latter’s essential truths 
without any appeal to revealed faith. Although Descartes’ ‘theistic’ 
approach to God’s existence at first sight resembles that of Thomas 
Aquinas in his Summa contra gentiles, their views of the relation 
between faith and reason differ dramatically. All this shows that 
theism is not identical with Christian religious thinking as such, but 
has its specific origin in modern philosophy.1 
Descartes’ strictly philosophical approach to the existence of God 
implied a dramatic shift by comparison to the way in which this 
question was treated in pre-modern thinking. One only needs to 
compare Anselm’s Proslogion, in which the ontological argument for 
God’s existence is formulated for the first time, to Descartes’ version 
of it in the fifth Meditation, whereas Anselm starts with praying for 
God’s help to understand what is already revealed to him by faith.2 
Descartes’ methodic doubt forces him to reject any appeal to 
revelation, thus stripping this argument completely of its religious 
nature. By doing so, Descartes turned the argument for God’s 
                                                                 
1 For an historical survey of the origin and the development of the term ‘Theism’ 
cf. Dierse (1998: 1054ff). 
2 “For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to 
understand” Anselm (1968: 100). 
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existence into a strictly scientific proof, whose truth Descartes was 
convinced had the same certainty as mathematical truths.3  
The Cartesian approach has proven to be paradigmatic for modern 
philosophy in general and its offsprings, among which theism belongs. 
Theism can be defined as the philosophical doctrine of the existence 
of a personal being who is the creator of the world, has a supreme 
intelligence and will, and is the source of all moral obligation. This 
doctrine is ‘foundational’ in the sense that every religious truth, pre-
eminently the existence of God, has to be deduced from a limited 
number of self-evident, universally accepted principles. Thus, 
religious foundationalism is the consequence of the application of the 
paradigm of the ‘mathesis universalis’ to religious truth.4 This means 
that theism is characterised by a kind of philosophical ‘take-over’ of 
Christian faith, thus giving a very specific interpretation to the 
traditional Christian idea of the connection between faith and reason, 
which, as such, has always been the key to any debate about religious 
truth, both in pre-modern and in modern thinking. 
Due to modernity’s focus on foundational and epistemological 
questions, other traditional subjects of Christian thinking, such as 
revelation, the narratives of the Bible, sacraments, spirituality, the 
church and so forth became far less important. As a child of 
modernity, theism wanted to present itself as a strictly philosophical 
doctrine in order to have a common debating ground with secular 
reason and its products, scepticism and atheism. Consequently it is no 
wonder that, as modern culture came more and more under the spell 
                                                                 
3 “The existence of God would pass with me for a truth at least as certain as I ever 
judged any truth of mathematics to be” Descartes (1996: 65f). 
4 I use the term ‘foundationalism’ as a characterisation of modern philosophy. It 
therefore has to be clearly distinguished from ‘fundamentalism’, which stands for 
the tendency of some religious communities to interpret their holy texts (the Bible 
or the Koran) literally and univocally. 
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of scientific reason, theism, reinforcing its ‘foundational’ and 
epistemological character, became generally accepted as the most 
suitable instance to defend the truth of religion, not only in 
confrontation with secularist philosophy, but also with the natural 
sciences. Especially in the Enlightenment, theism accepted the 
challenge to justify religion to the tribunal of reason. Crucial ‘theistic’ 
questions in this respect are: can God’s existence be proven in a way 
that can stand the test of a comparison with mathematics or natural 
sciences? Are the insights of theism in accordance with natural 
sciences, especially with theoretical physics (as far as the creation of 
the universe is concerned) and biology (when the spiritual nature of 
man is at stake)? 
In spite of its reputation of intellectual rigour and the seriousness with 
which it examined the results of science, with regard to their 
metaphysical implications and presuppositions, the theistic way of 
dealing with religious truth has also been severely criticised by many 
philosophers, ever since its emergence. The comparison between 
Anselm and Descartes with regard to the ontological argument 
already shows some problematic aspects of theism. Similar problems 
result from a comparison between Thomas Aquinas and modern 
theism. Each of the famous ‘five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas, being his 
answer to the question of whether God’s existence can be proven by 
reason, concludes with the phrase: “This is what all call God” 
(Aquinas 1952: quest. 2, art. 3). By doing so, Thomas in fact equated 
the results of these five arguments, viz. the unmoved mover, the first 
efficient cause, the necessary being, the ultimate cause of perfection, 
the intelligent end of all natural things, with the living God of 
Christian religion. For Thomas, as with Anselm, these arguments were 
embedded in a global religious frame of reference5, and played only a 
                                                                 
5 The medieval worldview can be characterised best by the word ‘ordo’ (order), 
encompassing the whole of being, viz. both the supra-natural and the natural. Of 
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subordinate role in their thinking, whereas the same arguments had a 
more crucial function in philosophical theism, as it sought to use these 
arguments to provide the natural sciences with a solid, metaphysical 
foundation, and simultaneously to firmly fix the existence of God in 
the modern, scientific worldview. But with the rise of theism, serious 
doubts about this approach arose. Apart from the fact that the 
cogency of the theistic arguments for God’s existence were repudiated 
by philosophers like Hume and Kant, other philosophers asked 
whether the rationalistic, foundationalist approach of theism was the 
best way to defend the truth of Christian religion. One can call to 
mind Pascal’s famous phrase, sewed in his doublet: “God of Abraham, 
God of Isaac, God of Jacob—Not of philosophers or the wise” (Pascal 
1904–14: 12). But one can also refer to Jacobi’s saying that the interest 
of philosophical science is, there be no God (Jacobi 2000: 96), or more 
recently to Heidegger’s deconstruction of the onto-theological 
character and of the principle of sufficient reason in modern 
metaphysics, culminating in his remark that man is incapable of 
praying to or sacrificing for the causa sui [literally self-caused], which 
he considers to be the essence of the theistic concept of God 
(Heidegger 1957: 64). 
Another illustrative critique of the foundational character of 
modernity, which in a way foreshadows the postmodern way of 
dealing with the question of religious truth, comes from the 
contemporary German philosopher Odo Marquard. He criticises the 
propensity of modern culture to justify all kinds of things by 
summoning them before the tribunal of reason, even the most 
contingent aspects of life. In line with the sceptical character of his 
                                                                                                                                     
course, God is both the principle and the end of this order, but nevertheless He 
essentially belongs to it, and is by no means separated from it. Therefore, in the 
eyes of the medieval mind it was unthinkable to completely separate 
(philosophical) thinking of the world from its divine origin and end. 
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philosophy, he criticises foundationalism by questioning, in a 
humorous way, our habit of looking for justifications for all sorts of 
things:  
Nowadays, there is a general tendency to force everybody and 
everything to justify themselves. Everyone has to enter into a 
‘context of justification’—its most luxurious shape is the so-
called ‘dominant-free discourse’—and has to justify him or 
herself, especially when one is stuck in a crisis of justification. 
And this seems everywhere to be the case nowadays—in an era 
that is readily called post-conventional. And if somewhere 
there might not be a crisis of justification yet, it is necessarily 
invented for the sake of the general propagation of the desire 
to justify oneself. Apparently, everything has to be justified 
nowadays: the family, the state, causality, the individual, 
chemistry, vegetables, hair growth, one’s temper, life, culture, 
the swimming trunks. In fact, there is only one thing that does 
not need to be justified: the exigency of a justification for 
everything and everyone. But why is this so? When I—in an 
attempt to be polite—introduce myself by saying: ‘Allow me to 
introduce myself: Marquard’, then the normal answer seems to 
be: ‘Without justification nothing at all is allowed here! Justify 
yourself! What gives you the right to be Marquard, such as you 
are, and not someone completely else? And with what right are 
you at all, rather than not-being?’ This climate of the need for 
justification is a phenomenon, that has to be recognised and 
named, and because it turns everything in a certain sense into 
a tribunal, I call it the tribunalisation of the modern social 
environment (Marquard 2003: 124).  
This quotation illustrates the embarrassment many faithful feel, when 
they are called to account for their being faithful. The main reason for 
this embarrassment is that they are forced to justify themselves even 
before they have spoken a word or performed any action, and have to 
respect the codes and rules, which were decreed without their consent. 
In spite of its self-created image of reasonableness and absence of 
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coercion, the modern discourse of justification has brought about its 
own mechanisms of power. It is especially those elements of modern 
culture that seemed to lack justification, such as revealed religion (as 
opposed to rational or natural religion), that are treated with an 
unusual degree of contempt. The unreasonableness of this seemingly 
rational demand for justification is quite obvious: apart from the fact 
that this discourse of justification is unable to justify itself, one can ask 
whether it is reasonable to expect people to justify their lives before 
they have started to live? Although this thesis seems ridiculous, one 
only has to keep in mind the concrete example of parents, who are 
expected to justify their decision to have their newly born child 
baptised, to show that it is all but theoretical.  
As far as theism is concerned, all these criticisms point in the same 
direction: due to its specific, that is rationalistic and foundational 
character, something essential has been lost in this attempt to grasp 
the truth of religion. One can legitimately ask whether theism really 
has succeeded in thinking the truth of religion as a concrete way of 
life. Can the abstract, metaphysical concepts of theism really serve as a 
foundation for and minimal content of the living God of Christian 
religion? Isn’t the committed, existential relation of the faithful 
towards God of a totally different nature than the neutral, theoretical 
relation of a philosopher towards the metaphysical absolute or of a 
scientist with regard to his theoretical assumptions? Moreover, one 
can doubt whether theism’s specific interpretation of the relation 
between faith and reason is adequate: doesn’t theism in fact supersede 
faith with reason? Finally, in the course of its development, theism 
itself became affected more and more by the scientific approach it was 
dependant on: as science gradually became more dominated by 
mathematics, theism often took a similar formalistic approach, thus 
appearing eventually as a kind of higher mathematical science about 
God. 
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Scientists, from their side, criticised the hidden religious agenda of 
theism. They considered theistic reason as unable to meet the normal 
scientific standards of objectivity, open-mindedness to new 
experiential data and theoretical insights that might disprove the 
theistic hypothesis. Because theism made the impression of not being 
prepared to seriously call into question its basic assumption—the 
existence of God, it gradually became less accepted as a serious 
discussion-partner by science, especially as, in the course of the 20th 
century, the development of the latter’s theoretical insights about the 
origin and evolution of the universe seemed to be less and less 
reconcilable with the religious belief in God as the personal creator of 
the world. 
All these developments contributed to theism’s loss of plausibility as a 
viable way to discuss the truth of religion, not only in contemporary 
philosophy, but also in religious circles. From the perspective of 
philosophy of culture the most serious problems facing theism are 
themselves a consequence of the growing uneasiness with the project 
of enlightened reason as such, in particular: its disenchanting effects 
upon our social environment, its contribution to the domination of 
instrumental reason to the detriment of other spheres of human 
existence, and last but not least its foundationalism, which abstracted 
too much from the fact that religion is first of all a way of life. In sum, 
just as the rise of theism was the effect of the emergence of modern, 
scientific reason, its decline also reflects the problems that this specific 
form of rationality has run into. Therefore, the basic Christian idea of 
the relation between faith and reason has to be developed in ways 
other than theism did in order to discuss religious truth 
philosophically. 
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Postmodernism and the evaporation of religious truth  
In general, the critique of the foundationalist nature of modern 
reason, including theism, is characteristic of postmodern philosophy. 
This raises the question of which alternative approach it suggests, in 
particular with regard to the idea of religious truth. It is important to 
note right from the start that postmodernism is not only an influential 
trend in contemporary philosophy, but also is an umbrella term for a 
popular attitude in contemporary society with regard to the existing 
diversity in ways of life. In the introduction of this contribution I used 
the term ‘bricolage’ to characterise the eclecticism of postmodernism. 
However, in this section I will discuss the way in which postmodern 
philosophy deals with the question of religious truth conceptually. 
Let us start by examining how a very influential postmodern 
philosopher like Rorty answers this question. According to him, 
modern foundationalism has appeared to fall short of expectations 
because it proved unable to represent nature objectively, as if 
philosophy were the mirror of nature (Rorty 1983). This means that 
the idea of objective knowledge, being the key to every kind of 
foundationalism, has lost its sense, and thus also the notion of 
objective truth. Giving up the hope of founding our basic thoughts 
upon objective reality means the end of modern, foundationalist 
philosophy, including theism: no (religious) conviction or tradition 
can legitimately claim to be objectively true. Instead, they are but 
contingent ‘final vocabularies’; their truth cannot be demonstrated 
‘objectively’, but only with circular arguments whose strength does 
not reach beyond the persons or communities using this vocabulary. 
Since the collapse of theism, which during modernity had served as a 
common universe of discourse, an objective meta-vocabulary, humans 
can no longer weigh the truth claims of different (religious) 
vocabularies against each other. This situation inevitably leads to an 
attitude of irony: ironists are  
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never quite able to take themselves seriously because [they are] 
always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves 
are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and 
fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves 
(Rorty 1999: 73f),  
that is, the contingency and fragility of who they actually are. They put 
this into practice by continually redescribing themselves, society, and 
the world in ever new ways; that is, by constantly re-creating 
themselves without referring to any normative eternal examples, like 
God, the Absolute, reason, truth etc. Consequently, the ironist 
dismisses any reasonable discussion about (religious) ways of life, 
because they are purely contingent, subjective preferences. As such, it 
does not make any sense at all to claim their truth. 
However, according to Rorty, the ironist is a pathological figure (1991: 
203), since he is constantly in doubt as to whether he hasn’t been 
raised in the ‘wrong’ language-game, and inclined to give up his 
vocabulary in favour of another. Because all vocabularies are equally 
contingent, there is no end to this search, so that the ironist never 
finds peace in any vocabulary. Consequently, the ironist runs the risk 
of not belonging to anything anymore, of completely loosing his 
identity. He can only avoid this risk by devoting himself to the 
vocabulary he is familiar with and consequently he simply declares 
that there are limits to what he can take seriously (Rorty 1991: 187f). 
In sum, we are fully entitled to be attached to (religious) traditions, 
although we are at the same time aware of the fact that they cannot 
make any claim to truth. Therefore, ethnocentrism is the inevitable 
consequence of Rorty’s postmodernism. 
The way in which postmodern philosophy suggests dealing with the 
existing divergence in ways of life is quite appealing to contemporary 
people: the lack, experienced by many, of a common ground for 
publicly discussing diverging ways of life rationally leads them to all 
kinds of pragmatic solutions, which mostly come down to an 
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individually inspired eclecticism. From this perspective, religion is 
good if it enables me to have: interesting experiences, insofar as it can 
make me happy, contributes to my mental and even physical health, 
helps me in finding the meaning of life, inspires and motivates me in 
my private and public life, promotes peace and social justice. In this 
way, religion is being reduced to its benefit for the individual and 
society. It only has a meaning insofar as it appeals to me, insofar as it 
can be integrated into my individual way of realising myself. Thus, 
religion is a part of the lifestyle-goods for sale on the market and 
promoted by the media. Only those elements of religious traditions 
that the creative individual can fit into his or her postmodern lifestyle 
are welcomed. Consequently, the very idea of religious truth, as 
contrasted with heresy, superstition, bigotry and the like, has 
evaporated; religion is no longer a matter of true substantial 
meanings, values and practices, but of the beneficial effects people try 
to reach through it. Religious traditions are not appreciated because of 
the truth embedded in them but only insofar they serve as a gold mine 
for the religious ‘bricoleur’. Religious elements that do not fit into this 
scheme like: moral values that run counter to the generally accepted 
secular, liberal morals; religiously inspired prescripts in clothing and 
other conspicuous religious symbols that make us feel a bit uneasy, are 
often treated with misunderstanding or contempt, and anyhow have 
to be banned as much as possible from public life. 
I find this evaporation of the whole idea of the truth of (religious) 
ways of life, and its disappearance from public discourse quite 
problematic. In fact, it leads to a situation in which we are entitled to 
stick to our curious convictions and funny habits, as long as their 
expression remains confined to the private sphere. They are not 
allowed to interfere with public life, which has to stay as neutral as 
possible in order not to offend other people’s ways of life. Let us 
examine whether giving up the whole idea of (religious) truth and its 
disappearance from public discourse is a viable option. 
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When Rorty calls an ironical attitude towards our final vocabularies 
‘pathological’ and considers that humans are entitled to stick to the 
vocabulary they are familiar with, he is pointing at an interesting 
aspect of our ways of life: in spite of our cherished idea of 
multicultural open-mindedness most of us are substantially attached 
to all kinds of contingent and parochial habits, traditions, and 
practices. Many of our daily habits, from the kind of food we prefer to 
our morning or evening rituals, belong to this category. We usually 
perform them unconsciously, and we only realise the substantial 
character of our attachment to them when we have to forego them for 
some time. The substantial character of some of our attachments 
becomes even clearer if we look at our attachment to our native 
language. As the word ‘native’ already indicates, it is the language we 
are most familiar with in the sense that it enables us to express and 
share our deepest thoughts and emotions. We experience this most 
clearly when, staying abroad, we feel somewhat hampered while 
communicating with others on a deeper level than the usual ‘airport 
information’. Immigrants and people belonging to a linguistic 
minority are also painfully aware of this handicap in everyday life, and 
of the social and economic discrimination resulting from it. 
However, although we are substantially attached to our daily habits 
and native language, nobody seriously wants to lay claim to their 
truth. The substantial attachment to our native language does not at 
all mean that it is more ‘true’ or superior in comparison to other 
languages. On the contrary, all attempts to upgrade our substantial 
attachment in such a way lead to oppressing those who have other 
substantial attachments. Take for example the ancient Greeks, who 
underscored their pretension to ‘linguistic superiority’ by calling 
foreigners barbarians, thereby disqualifying the language of these 
foreigners as ‘jabber’. This clearly shows how essential it is to realise 
that the objects of many of our substantial attachments are 
contingent, and have to remain so. It prevents us from imposing them 
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on others, since this would imply an illegitimate violation of their 
personal integrity. So far, I agree with Rorty’s analysis of the 
substantial attachment to all kinds of contingent vocabularies, and 
also with his conclusion that taking an ironical attitude towards them 
is no option. 
My problems with the postmodern position begin when we try to 
answer the following crucial question: Does the pragmatic attitude 
with regard to our attachment to the variety of final vocabularies hold 
true for all our substantial attachments, such as our attachment to 
democracy, human rights, social justice, and the position of women in 
society? Does it make as little sense to speak of their truth as it does to 
speak of the truth of our daily habits or native language? Are the ideals 
of truth and justice nothing more than a social construction of a like 
minded local community, having no meaning at all for other people 
not belonging to this group? My point is that the meaning of such 
basic notions as truth and justice is not confined to the private sphere 
of a local club or ‘ethnos’, but has a transcendent dimension. 
In order to show this, I first want to query Rorty’s idea of a strict 
separation between the private and the public sphere. He somehow 
misses the point of what it means to people that some of their 
substantial attachments find public recognition as being true or just 
on reasonable grounds. As Charles Taylor (1991) has made clear, 
every process of recognition is situated against the background of 
what really counts as essential, valuable, true or just. It is impossible 
for the individual to decide this all by himself, because the use of these 
categories refers per se to a sphere that transcends an individual 
opinion or decision. That is why recognition usually takes the form of 
a public judgement, based upon the result of public debate, the order 
of things, or the nature of human beings. To give an example: when 
Islamic women claim the right to wear a scarf outdoors, they not so 
much claim the individual right to differ from other women, but want 
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society to publicly recognise that the Islamic way to express the 
position of women in relation to men is of equal value as the Western 
liberal view on women in public life. Although wearing a scarf seems 
to be an outstanding example of Rorty’s idea of a substantial 
attachment to something completely contingent, it actually is an 
expression of a fundamental value regarding the position of women in 
public life, and its public recognition is necessary to allow this value to 
come ‘true’. 
Some expressions of truth and justice are even universally recognised, 
as is the case with the universal declaration of human rights. However 
inadequate its concrete phrasing is, in the sense that it needs to be 
refined and adapted to new insights and debates, the fact that this 
declaration is qualified as universal refers to a transcendent idea of 
truth and justice, of what essentially belongs to human dignity and a 
truly humane society. Because of its universality this declaration 
claims to transcend the many existing final vocabularies of local 
communities. Moreover, this universality serves as a point of 
orientation for what has to be recognised on a more local level. 
Among many things, recognition inevitably implies unequal 
recognition, as some convictions and practices are considered as more 
truthful, valuable, or just than others. An equal recognition of any 
conviction or practice whatsoever would put an end to the whole idea 
of recognition, just as attributing royal honour to everyone would 
make such an honour worthless.  
The striving for recognition does not necessarily mean that others 
have to adopt our substantial commitments for the orientation of 
their own lives. This would be a denial of the inevitable dissemination 
of our lives, and consequently of the real divergence of our substantial 
commitments as they are embodied in the contingency of our 
concrete existence as finite human beings. It is an illusion to expect 
that this real divergence of substantial (religious) commitments can 
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eventually be superseded by a peaceful dialogue between (religious) 
ways of life or by waiting for their eschatological fusion. On the 
contrary, the striving for recognition of the truth of diverging ways of 
life often appears as a painful confrontation of irreconcilable practices. 
But nevertheless, the process of striving for recognition shows that 
there is something essential at stake: others ask us to recognise that 
their substantial commitments to their ways of life are attempts to 
express something essential and of equal value to our own expressions 
of our substantial commitments, although we may not share their 
commitments and they may even fill us with repulsion. One could 
even say that the process of recognition can only take place against the 
background of conflicting substantial meanings, because only then are 
all partners in this process aware of the fact that there is something 
essential at stake. Therefore, we feel deeply frustrated when others 
don’t want to take our substantial meanings seriously, and reduce 
them to contingent, private opinions whose acceptance does not rest 
upon their substance, but merely upon their private character, and 
dependant on them not causing too much trouble. 
This reasoning shows that we depend on a public and sometimes even 
universal recognition of the value of many of our substantial 
attachments. In the end, we don’t want to be left alone with our 
contingent convictions and practices, nor are we prepared to leave 
others alone with theirs. We humans are too dependent on 
recognition by others of our substantial meanings to seriously 
consider ourselves as the only creators of truth and meaning in a 
meaningless world. Admitting this conclusion implies that we always 
make use of substantial notions like truth and justice, and that by 
doing so, we claim that they transcend the level of a social 
construction by local communities.  
An even more ‘substantial’ argument against the postmodern 
evaporation of the idea of truth has to do with the finiteness of our 
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lives. The existential doubt of many postmodern people as to whether 
they haven’t been raised in the wrong ‘final vocabulary’, eventually 
making them insane, not only makes their pragmatic decision to stick 
to the contingent way of life they are familiar with plausible, as Rorty 
argues, but also illustrates something else, which goes counter to 
Rorty’s view: nobody seriously wants to devote his or her life 
completely to things that in the end turn out to be futile. In particular 
this has to do with tension between the inevitable temporariness of 
our lives as corporeal beings and the transcendent meanings we aim at 
as spiritual beings. If every option we take could endlessly be 
reconsidered, we wouldn’t be affected by existential anxiety at all; nor 
if we were only material beings, radically confined to the here and 
now. But we know all too well what is done cannot be undone, 
especially when, in the case of concrete, practical decisions, we 
become painfully aware of the meaning of the saying that you can’t 
have it both ways. In all these cases, Rorty’s suggestion of pragmatic 
solutions to avoid this anxiety does not suffice. As an illustration of 
the impact of the tension between the temporariness of life and the 
transcendence of meaning upon the behaviour of humans, one only 
needs to refer to perhaps the most substantial attachment people have, 
the one of parents to their children. As they of course want to give 
their children the best education they can, they not only look for 
pragmatic answers in regard to how to raise their children, but also 
ask themselves much more fundamental or transcendental questions; 
the latter eventually come down to what a ‘good’ education implies, 
which inevitably is also an education aimed at the good. The fact that 
most parents ask themselves these questions, and that they feel 
existentially devastated if their children go astray, surely does not 
mean that they suffer from a kind of ‘metaphysical disease’, as Rorty 
suggests. On the contrary, it shows their mental health, as they realise 
that their substantial commitment to their children also implies that 
they teach them substantial values. The fact that the truth-value of 
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vocabularies about education or the value of different ways of 
educating one’s children cannot be weighed against each other 
objectively does prevent people from looking for what is essential, 
valuable or just.  
An existential approach of religious truth  
The shortcomings of both the theistic and the postmodern answers to 
the question of religious truth make it necessary to try an alternative 
road and to examine whether it brings us further. A preliminary step 
is to answer the question, raised by postmodern philosophy, of 
whether religion, in spite of its self-image, belongs to the category of 
contingent matters, alongside our daily habits or native language. If 
so, my critique of Rorty’s position in the previous section would have 
missed the point as to whether it makes sense to speak of religious 
truth. It cannot be denied that religion, both on a cultural and a 
personal level, is partly the result of all kinds of contingent elements. 
One has only to keep in mind the history of all religions, being full of 
contingencies, and the importance of education and other forms of 
religious socialisation to a person’s faith. However, especially in a 
society in which being religious is becoming less and less self evident, 
many faithful consider that they commit their lives to something 
substantially true, transcending the contingent convictions of a local 
community. Essentially, this is because Christianity—as well as many 
other religions—is a religion of conversion: Christians orient their 
lives by placing themselves under the sign of the risen Christ. In spite 
of all the contingent reasons that have led them to this orientation, 
they do not consider their faith as a contingent option, but are 
convinced that Christ is their Saviour, since he is the way, the truth, 
and the life (John 14: 6). This involves a promise of salvation that not 
only counts for the individual Christian, but is true for all people. 
Through a variety of concrete experiences, behaviours and ways of 
thinking, the faithful bear testimony to this fundamental truth of their 
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faith. Outstanding examples of this are the martyrs: the original 
meaning of this (Greek) word is someone who publicly testifies to the 
truth of their faith, if necessary at the cost of their lives. But even in 
more ordinary situations, the dynamics of personal conversion make 
it clear that people experience their religious way of life as something 
substantial, belonging to a different category from contingent daily 
habits and native language. Especially when they form a religious 
minority, people usually are sharply aware of this. 
But the fact that people are so deeply convinced of the truth of their 
(religious) ways of life that some of them are even prepared to give 
their lives for it is as such not a sufficient reason for their truth. First 
of all, there is the question of how a religious community deals with 
the truth of its tradition. I would suggest calling this kind of 
discussion an immanent one, because both its active participants and 
its addressees are primarily members of a specific religious 
community. Every religion consists of heterogeneous stories, 
teachings and rituals, which highlight specific elements of its truth. It 
is of vital importance that a religious community, or at least their 
spiritual and intellectual leaders, somehow clarify the relation between 
these elements. This also implies that they have to keep the true spirit 
of their religious tradition alive by (re-)interpreting its meaning in the 
light of the times, and ask for its (practical) meaning. Finally, as all 
humans, including the faithful, are intellectually and morally finite 
beings, and thus may err, it is essential for a religious community to 
examine whether it is still faithful to its original inspiration, and hasn’t 
lost the right track in the course of history.  
However, especially in a globalising world, in which various religious 
and non-religious worldviews make exclusive claims to truth, and in 
which we experience daily that not all of them have a salutary effect on 
humanity, it is essential to find ways to also discuss religious truth on 
a transcendent level, one that is also intelligible for people not 
Religious truth in a globalising world • 199 
 
belonging to this or that (religious) community. Of course this 
transcendent discussion is a very complicated one, since discussing 
the truth of deviant ways of life often appears as a painful 
confrontation of irreconcilable ideas and practices. But in my view, 
this is the only option remaining. The postmodern idea that every 
individual or community has its right to its own final vocabulary as 
long as it does not affect the others, evidently has reached its limits 
because of the growing interdependence of people and societies. This 
is where the kind of philosophy of religion I propose in this essay 
comes into play. Contrary to postmodern philosophy, it has the idea 
of religious truth as its central focus, but approaches it from an 
existential perspective. By taking this approach, it is opposed to 
theism as well, which often has laid religion on the procrustean bed of 
an abstract, rationalistic determination of its truth. My suggestion is 
that philosophy of religion takes (elements of) a concrete religious 
way of life as its point of departure and reveal the truth embedded 
in it. 
In order to clarify what I mean by such an approach, I give a concrete 
example, the prayer for forgiveness in the Our Father: “Forgive us our 
debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors” (Matthew 6: 12). 
Christians are substantially and personally committed to this prayer, 
not only because it is taught by Christ himself, but also because it 
expresses a personal involvement with regard to this aspect of the 
existential truth of the Christian way of life: forgiveness essentially 
qualifies both the vertical relation of God towards humans, and the 
horizontal relation of humans towards each other.  
A first element of the existential truth of this prayer becomes manifest 
if one links it to the dynamics of human morality, especially the 
relationship between norms and values. In common parlance these 
terms are often used indiscriminately. Nevertheless it is essential to 
distinguish them and determine their relation more precisely. Usually 
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norms appear as obligations: thou shall not kill, thou shall not give 
false witness, and also, thou shall forgive thy debtor. However, if these 
norms are only seen as moral obligations, they run the risk of 
remaining a dead letter, because the positive value, for the sake of 
which we have to obey this moral rule, becomes concealed. Therefore, 
it is important to fill out such norms with concrete experiences of the 
good, which show that it really is valuable to obey these norms. So, if 
the obligatory character of norms is to remain effective, they have to 
be linked to the experience of the positive value, that forgiveness 
makes the world a better place to live in. In the history of philosophy, 
Kant, whose categorical imperative usually counts as the culmination 
of a morality of obligation, was very well aware of the need to 
complete it by his theory of the supreme good, being the ultimate end 
of all moral actions.6 
This anthropological argument for the existential truth of forgiveness, 
however, does not prove why the religious commandment to forgive 
would be true. Essentially, the prayer for forgiveness shows that the 
horizontal moral obligation to forgive one’s debtor is connected to a 
vertical dimension, the beneficial experience that our existence, 
however sinful it may be, is basically accepted by God’s grace. 
Especially because Christians believe that God is their heavenly father, 
and thus transcends the vicissitudes that characterise all human 
relations, they know that they can count on his promise of gracefully 
accepting their existence: God mercifully forgives our debts against 
him, which are infinitely greater. This inspires Christians even to do 
the unthinkable—to forgive the unforgivable. In other words, the 
basic experience that our sinful existence is being accepted by God 
makes it legitimate that he demands from us, not to forgive our 
brothers and sisters seven times, “but seventy times seven times” 
(Matthew 18: 21). Thus, the truth of the prayer for forgiveness is the 
                                                                 
6 I develop this issue further Jonkers (2000: 132f). 
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essential connection of a horizontal and a vertical dimension: the 
experience of God’s grace, that is the vertical dimension of the prayer 
for forgiveness, is essential for the horizontal obligation to forgive our 
debtors. This analysis shows a way in which philosophy of religion can 
help in making the prayer for forgiveness, expressing an existential 
religious truth, intelligible to other people by linking it to the general 
structure of human morality. 
The prayer for forgiveness, expressing a double but asymmetrical 
relation towards God on the one hand, and towards our neighbours 
on the other, also expresses another aspect of religious truth, viz. that 
it can be put to the test, albeit in a different way than in theism. It goes 
without saying that lots of counter examples can be given of 
(religious) people refusing to forgive each other, and even of God 
refusing forgiveness to his people (for example when God punishes 
the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah for their indecent behaviour). 
However, they don’t falsify the truth of our religious commitment in 
the foundationalist sense of the word. But does this mean that faith in 
the truth of forgiveness is blind? No, it can be put to the test, but only 
on an existential level, when our Christian way of life is at stake. I once 
heard a story of a man who returned from a concentration camp after 
the Second World War. Even after his return, he was unable to pray 
the Our Father, especially the prayer for forgiveness, no matter how 
hard he tried. He was overwhelmed with bitterness and hatred. 
Apparently, his Christian way of life, implying the faith in a merciful 
God who forgives our trespasses and asks us to do the same to our 
neighbours, had been so deeply put to the test that he could not 
forgive the Nazis for their terrible atrocities, and thus could not 
commit himself anymore to forgiving his neighbours after the war. 
Suddenly, a woman rushed into the man’s house, crying out that 
fellow villagers were going to bury her son alive for having 
collaborated with the Nazis. “You are the only person, who can save 
my child”, she begged. The man stood up, went to the scene where the 
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burial was taking place, and said to the executioners: “If you go on 
burying this boy alive, I will jump into the hole to be buried with 
him”. They looked at him, wondering whether he really meant it, and 
stopped throwing sand on the boy’s body. And so the man saved the 
boy’s life and regained his faith. 
This story shows how an existential religious truth can be put to the 
test. For the man in question, the experience of the war served as a 
dramatic counterexample of the truth of his faith, in particular his 
capacity to forgive those who had committed atrocities during the 
war. However, it turns out that the existential nature of putting to the 
test this religious truth differs considerably from the alleged neutrality 
and objectivity of theism. Similarly, the man did not regain his faith as 
a result of some theological exposé about whether God was or wasn’t 
present in Auschwitz, but because of an existential experience where, 
by saving someone else’s life through forgiving him, he was also able 
to save his own life, since being filled with hatred implies that one has 
stopped living from the very moment that an unforgivable deed is 
inflicted. A contingent experience, however painful and unjust it may 
be, is turned into something absolute. 
In sum, the philosophical analysis of the prayer for forgiveness shows 
how an existential truth, which is essential to a Christian way of life, 
not only regards a community of faithful, but also expresses an 
essential quality of human relations as such. 
Conclusion 
This paper has dealt with the question of how to speak about religious 
truth in a globalising world. Firstly, it has become clear that theism is 
not the most adequate approach to religious truth. The main reason 
for this pertains to the foundationalist interpretation of the relation 
between faith and reason. This implied that theism took a very 
rationalistic turn and abstracted from religion as a way of life; besides, 
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against the conviction of Descartes and so many philosophers after 
him, theism’s discussions with the sciences turned out to be relatively 
unsuccessful. If one accepts these conclusions, it means that one has to 
answer the question of religious truth on a less abstract, propositional 
level, and take a more existential approach, one that seeks to 
philosophise about the truth of religion on the concrete level of people 
placing their lives under the sign of the risen Christ. Secondly, it also 
has become clear that the postmodern suggestion of giving up the idea 
of truth altogether and replacing it with a pragmatic approach 
eventually fails, at least in those fields of human existence that matter 
on a fundamental level, such as human rights, social justice and other 
essential values and truths, including religious ones. Thirdly, the 
effects of globalisation make us aware of the fact that we no longer get 
away with pragmatic answers to these fundamental questions, let 
alone the ‘anything goes’ mentality, however popular they still are in 
contemporary postmodern society. A globalising society, 
characterised by a qualitative and quantitative increase in religious 
diversity and the inevitable tensions resulting from it, cannot permit 
itself the luxury anymore of letting the idea of the truth of (religious) 
ways of life to evaporate. This gives a practical urgency to the issue of 
religious truth. 
If philosophers of religion want to try the existential approach to 
religious truth, they first of all need to be familiar with what a 
religious way of life means, just like philosophers of art are required to 
have some familiarity with art. By accepting this condition, they 
somehow continue the pre-modern tradition of faithful thinking, of 
faith searching for understanding, albeit in a totally different context 
than the one of Anselm, who was one of its founding fathers. This 
difference primarily concerns the dominance of secular ways of life 
and the growing presence of non-Christian religious traditions. They 
make the position of contemporary religious philosophers look 
similar to the one of the apostle Paul on the Areopage. Just as Paul had 
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to explain the truth of the Christian way of life to epicurean and stoic 
philosophers, who did not at all share his basic convictions, the task of 
contemporary philosophers of religion is also to explain the 
substantially true in the religious way of life they are familiar with, as 
reasonably as possible, so that it is also intelligible to people not 
sharing it. 
But such an existential approach to religious truth can only be 
successful if philosophy is aware of some theoretical presuppositions, 
and discusses them critically on a meta-level. Due to lack of space and 
time I will only indicate them here briefly. First, this approach 
depends on the conviction that something essential or substantially 
true is indeed embodied in all kinds of concrete ways of life, both 
religious and secular. Since philosophy has taken an existential 
perspective as its point of departure, there is no possibility of proving 
this presupposition on a neutral, external level, as I showed in the 
previous section. This problem, which is an aspect of the 
hermeneutical circle, is an inevitable consequence of the non-
foundational character of any existential approach. We just don’t have 
an a priori, objective standard at our disposal, with the help of which 
the substantial truth of a (religious) way of life could be determined 
unambiguously. We can only solve this problem a posteriori, by 
bringing this method into practice, and spending all our expertise on 
philosophically explaining the essence of a (religious) way of life, thus 
making it as strong and convincing as possible, also with 
consideration for people not belonging to this or that specific religious 
tradition. The second presupposition is that philosophy is able to set 
up a critical discussion of the diverging truths, embedded in various 
(religious) ways of life. In order to do so, it has to transcend from 
hermeneutics to metaphysics, from a contextual analysis of religious 
truths to their meaning for human existence as such. From the 
perspective of contemporary philosophy, which usually takes a very 
critical attitude towards any kind of metaphysical thinking, this 
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presupposition is the most hazardous one. However, the kind of 
metaphysics I have in mind here are much more modest than modern, 
foundational, theistic metaphysics. It does not abstract from all 
particularity, thus producing only an abstract essence, but looks for 
the essential in the particular. Thirdly, especially in a globalising 
world, it is essential that philosophers from various religious 
backgrounds participate in this discussion. Here, the advantage of an 
existential approach to religious truth is the most clear. It is 
commonly known that, in comparison to other religious traditions, 
Christianity, due to its history, has a very strong philosophical 
character and a long tradition of discussing its truth with secular 
reason. Consequently, other religions run the risk of being in a 
disadvantaged position right from the start in their capacity to engage 
with secular reason. In this situation, taking concrete elements of 
religious ways of life as a point of departure does not force these 
religions to participate in a rationalistic, foundationalist discussion 
they are not familiar with and perhaps even consider as totally 
inadequate to explain religious truth. In my view, one of the most 
intriguing challenges for philosophy of religion in a globalising world 
is to develop such an existential approach of religious truth, and by 
doing so discover if and how these three presuppositions are sound. 
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